U.S.S. *Nevada* from June 6 to June 15, 1944, off Normandy, France, UTAH Beach

Part Three

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Edited By Tony DiGiulian



U.S.S. *Nevada* (BB-36)
U.S. Navy Photograph PD102 National Archives and Records Administration, Still Pictures Division, College Park, Md.

Part Three

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Preface to Part 3

In Part 3, I will be discussing *Nevada*'s Main and Secondary Battery Missions of June 11th until June 15th. For background information, please see the Introduction in Part 1.

German Status on June 11, 1944

By June 11, 1944, the slow progress of U.S. troops in taking the shore batteries such as Target #3 (German designation STP 135) Crisbecq and Target #14A (German designation Wn22) Mont Coquerel which were still holding out, and the beach fortifications along the coast from Target #90 to Target #102 gave Rommel some hope. There was still heavy fighting along the Quinéville to Montebourg line. Rommel's reaction on June 11, 1944, and his assessment of Allied objectives.

- To gain a deep beachhead between (the rivers) Orne and Vire as a base for later attack with strong forces into the interior of France, probably in the direction of Paris.
- To cut off the Cotentin peninsula and take Cherbourg as quickly as possible in order to have a large effective harbor. It also seems possible, however, as things develop, that the enemy will forego the seizure of the Cotentin Peninsula if the fighting there becomes too hard and make an early thrust into the interior of France, using all means at his disposal.¹

Rommel wrote: "As a result of the stubborn fighting by the troops engaged in the coastal defense section and the immediate hasty counterattacks by the larger available reserves, the progress of the enemy operations has been considerably slower than the enemy had hoped, despite the use of the strongest means of combat."²

Rommel hoped to form a solid line between the Orne and Vire rivers. He wished to exchange Panzer divisions with infantry divisions so that mobile reserves could be created. However, his cut off troops on the Cotentin peninsula could not be relieved. He hopes to crush the Americans between Carentan and Montebourg and this would relieve the threat on Cherbourg. Only after this was accomplished does an attack between the Orne and Vire rivers

¹This expresses his fear that British forces breaking out might threaten Paris or even make a direct thrust toward Germany. Decision in West 1944, The Oberbefehishaber west and the repulsion of Allied Invasion (Ose, Dieter: Entscheidung im Western 1944: der Oberbefehishaber West und die Abwehr der alliierten invasion. Hellos: Aachen, Germany, 2013, S.322)

² Decision in West 1944, The Oberbefehishaber west and the repulsion of Allied Invasion (Ose, Dieter: Entscheidung im Western 1944: der Oberbefehishaber West und die Abwehr der alliierten invasion. Hellos: Aachen, Germany, 2013, S.322)

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seem viable to him. His operations in Normandy, however, are made extraordinarily difficult, and in some cases even impracticable, by the following:

Rommel wrote: "The exceptionally strong, in part overwhelming superiority of the enemy air forces. As I and officers of my staff have repeatedly seen for ourselves and as the troop commanders, especially Obergruppenfuhrer Sepp Dietrich (Commander I. SS Panzer Corps) report, the enemy completely controls the airspace over the battle area up to 100 km behind the front, and by day with strong fighter bomber and bomber formations almost prevents all traffic on roads, paths, and open terrain. Even the movement of smaller units on the battlefield, artillery emplacements, deployment of tanks and the like, are immediately bombed from the air to devastating effect."

"The effect of heavy naval artillery. Up to 640 heavy guns were used. The effect is so strong that operations in the space dominated by this rapid artillery fire is impossible with either infantry or Panzer units. Despite this heavy bombardment, the garrisons on the coast and the counterattacking troops in the Montebourg area held their positions with extreme tenacity."

"As Obergruppenfuhrer Sepp Dietrich has reported to me, the enemy Panzer units are conducting the battle already at 3,500 meters with greatest expenditure of ammunition and excellently supported by the enemy air forces. This was also the case at El Alamein. Furthermore, the strong artillery superiority and the particular large ammunition reserves already become apparent." 5

"Parachute and airlanding troops are employed in such mass and are so maneuverable that the engaged forces find it difficult to resist them. Once enemy airborne units have parachuted into terrain unoccupied by us, they immediately set up for defense and are difficult to defeat by infantry attacks with artillery support. Further sorties, especially in areas not occupied by us, are to be expected. Since the enemy with his air force, has been shown in the last few days, can

³ Decision in West 1944, The Oberbefehishaber west and the repulsion of Allied Invasion, (Ose, Dieter: Entscheidung im Western 1944: der Oberbefehishaber West und die Abwehr der alliierten invasion. Hellos: Aachen, Germany, 2013, S.322-323)

⁴ Rommel likely used German Army standards to describe heavy artillery which is 15 cm or larger. Decision in West 1944, The Oberbefehishaber west and the repulsion of Allied Invasion (Ose, Dieter: Entscheidung im Western 1944: der Oberbefehishaber West und die Abwehr der alliierten invasion. Hellos: Aachen, Germany, 2013, S.323)

⁵ Decision in West 1944, The Oberbefehishaber west and the repulsion of Allied Invasion (Ose, Dieter: Entscheidung im Western 1944: der Oberbefehishaber West und die Abwehr der alliierten invasion. Hellos: Aachen, Germany, 2013, S.323

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paralyze our mobile formations for days, but is himself operating with fast formations and airborne troops, our own situation becomes extremely difficult."

At this time the German High Command including Adolf Hitler were highly critical of the German troops engaged at Normandy for their failure to throw the allies back into the sea. Rommel was defending his troops. What this tells me is Hitler did not fully comprehend how strategically weak a position he was actually in and how important naval power was.

This assessment by Rommel speaks to Allied naval forces and tactical air power placing a geographical area under siege. This siege was allowing friendly forces to move through this territory while denying the Germans ability to do the same. This control lets the Allied logistical train to pour troops into the area at a rate faster than Germany can build up their forces, despite not having a deep water port which was thanks to the Mulberry artificial harbor. This is the very core of Mahan's third principle at work. This is why, without a blue water navy capable of seizing control of the English Channel, the Third Reich was strategically weak. Without a navy capable of contesting control of the sea the German Army had no practical answer to this problem.


U.S.S. Nevada Status on June 11, 1944

From U.S.S. *Nevada*'s log: 0105 June 11, 1944, smoke vessels laid smoke screen. E-boats reported in vicinity. DD in screen commenced firing star shells. 0300 E-Boat attack warning received. 0328-0411 intercepted and jammed 11 guided missile control signals. 0355 splash seen and explosion felt in direction of transport area immediately following guided missile control signal. 0405 during the following guided missile control signal, a red flare was seen swiftly moving in a shallow gliding angle from port to starboard hitting water bearing 315 degrees true less than 1,000 yards. Object bounced or skipped with large splash and flare went out. No explosion was heard or felt. 0409 another red flare in sky ahead. 0415 another red flare in sky bearing 000 degrees true. 0417 much AA fire from screen. Plane overhead dropping illumination flares. Heavy explosion felt. 0422 095 degrees true distance 500 yards. 0422-0515 much air activity drawing AA fire from screen. 0515 plane shot down.

Nevada operational plan for the day was to continue hammering German fortifications along the Quinéville to Montebourg line and the beach front which were still resisting U.S. forces. At 0700 she commenced firing on German positions.

⁶Decision in West 1944, The Oberbefehishaber west and the repulsion of Allied Invasion (Ose, Dieter: Entscheidung im Western 1944: der Oberbefehishaber West und die Abwehr der alliierten invasion. Hellos: Aachen, Germany, 2013, S.323)

June 11, 1944, 0700-30 to 0941-35



U.S.S. *Nevada* completed Main Battery Missions 41 and 42 and completed Secondary Battery Missions 11, 12 and 13 during this time period. Secondary Mission 11-13 were fired simultaneously with each other. The *Nevada* engaged Target #96, (German designation Wn 18) Target #98 (in-between Wn 18 and Wn 19), and Target #102 (German designation Wn 19). Main Battery Missions 41 and 42 were on the same Target #14A (German designation Wn22) Mount Coquerel.


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Main Battery Mission 41



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 41 Target #14A (German designation Wn22) 4th Battalion of the 1261 Marine Artillery Regiment, 0700-30 to 0704-55.⁷ French Lambert Zone 1 vO362080 Latitude: 49° 30' 52" N, Longitude: 1° 18' 26" W.


⁷ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 41, page 94 of full report.



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Author's note: This mission was unobserved due to haze. Results undetermined.

Secondary Battery Mission 11



U.S.S. *Nevada* Secondary Battery Mission 11. All Ships firing schedule June 11, 1944, 0700 to 0705.8 Just south of Target #96 (German designation Wn 18). Target coordinates French Lambert Zone 1 vO379077 Latitude : 49° 30′ 45″ N, Longitude : 1° 17′ 01″ W.

⁸ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 63, page 121 of full report.

U.S.B. HYVADA

Bull-Calladia?

SECONDARY BATTERY MISSISHS FIRED JUNE 6 - 17, 1944.

MISSICH NO. 11 Bettery 5-/38 Cal. Date 11 June 1944

Time 0700 to 0705

Terget Coordinates 379077 Ship's Coordinates 515053

Terget Revigational Range 15.210 Gun Range 15.500

True Bearing 277°55'

Spotting method: Indirect fire, unobserved due to haze.

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RESULTS: Mone observed due to haze. No report of damage received on board.

COMMENTS:

Missions 11, 12, and 1) were fired simultaneously from the starboard bettery in compliance with an "all Ships" firing schedule. Assumition allowance was 40 rounds for all three Secondary entery targets and firing time limited to five minutes. The CVINCY Necessary Entery was assigned to fire at these same three targets at the same time with the same assumition allowance. An effort was made to arrange for the NEVADA to take target #96, the CVINCY target #100, and the two ships to fire on target #98. An enswer was not received and it was accessary to split the bettery three ways and fire a small amount of assumition at each target. It is believed that the assumition allowance was neither sufficient to assure any hits in indirect fire nor sufficient to give any saturation of the target had the visibility made spetting possible. No battery casualties occurred.

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ENGLOSURE (B)/2


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Secondary Battery Mission 12



U.S.S. *Nevada* Secondary Battery Mission 12 Target #98 June 11, 1944, 0700 to 0705. French Lambert Zone 1 vO379077, Latitude : 49° 30' 45" N, Longitude : 1° 17' 01" W.

⁹ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 64, page 122 of full report.



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Secondary Battery Mission 13



U.S.S. *Nevada* Secondary Battery Mission 13 Target #100 June 11, 1944, 0700 to 0705. Target coordinates French Lambert Zone 1 vO374086, Latitude: 49° 31' 14" N, Longitude: 1° 17' 28" W. These coordinates are not the same for Target #100 provided in *Nevada*'s Main Battery Mission 40 at location vO373085. Target #100 is the La Sinope Dam. These coordinates land on Target #102 (German designation Wn 19) and this matches her description of a strongpoint with six machine gun positions. I believe this mission was directed against Target #102 (German designation Wn19).


¹⁰ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 65, page 123 of full report.

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
Author's note: This was Nevada's final secondary mission for the Normandy Campaign.

Main Battery Mission 42



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 42 Target #14A (German designation Wn22) 4th Battalion of the 1261 Marine Artillery Regiment, from 0931-30 to 0941-35. French Lambert Zone 1 vO362080, Latitude: 49° 30′ 52″ N, Longitude: 1° 18′ 26″ W.

¹¹ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 42, page 95 of full report.




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Author's note: At about 0932 on the third salvo of Main Battery Mission 42, the left gun of Turret 2 had a hang fire. The left gun was reported in the elevated position. The firing of the right gun alone placed a torque on the turret training gear and this caused the teeth of the training pinion, which engaged with the training worm, to burr and resulted in the turret jamming in train. The left gun was then elevated and fired on a safe bearing to clear the barrel. The burred teeth of the training pinion were scraped with a bearing scraper to remove the burr. This took between two and three hours after which the turret trained normally. This same casualty had occurred in Turret 2 during a practice firing in Scotland just prior to the invasion. During the next Navy Yard period, the turret's training gear was disassembled to find and remove the cause of the jamming.¹²

¹² United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure E page 5, page 204 of full report.

June 11, 1944, 1639-45 to 2224-20.



U.S.S. *Nevada* completed Main Battery Mission 43 and 44 during this time period. Mission 43 was on Target #1A: I believe Target #1A was the radar station (German designation B7 or possibly Wn 149). Mission 44 was against an enemy artillery unit north of Montebourg.


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Main Battery Mission 43



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 43 Target 1A June 11, 1944, 1639-45 to 1642-20. ¹³ French Lambert Zone 1 vO366201, Latitude : 49° 37' 24" N, Longitude : 1° 18' 36" W.

¹³ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 43, page 96 of full report.



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Author's note: I believe Target #1A was the radar station (German designation B7 or possibly Wn 149) of the three elements that make up the defensive complex around the village of La Pernelle, comprising two artillery batteries (German designation HKB Pernelle 1, Pernelle 2 Wn 148) and a radar station (station B7). The description of guns and casemates however more closely described Pernelle 2 Wn 148 which she will engage in Mission 48. In all likelihood the gun flashes are AA guns shooting at the spotting aircraft.

Main Battery Mission 44



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 44 Enemy Artillery June 11, 1944, 2222-45 to 2224-20.¹⁴ French Lambert Zone 1 vO304070, Latitude : 49° 30' 11" N, Longitude : 1° 23' 12" W.

¹⁴ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 44, page 97 of full report

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
Author's note: This was the last mission fired on June 11, 1944. She had expended 33 x 14-inch AP, 13 x 14-inch HC, and 40 x 5-inch AA common projectiles. She had remaining on board 200 x 14-inch AP, 754 x 14-inch HC, 7,386 x 5-inch AA common projectiles. ¹⁵

From *Nevada*'s log: 0000 June 12, anchored as before, weather overcast, clearing, cool, fresh breeze, visibility good. Considerable land action in progress. Large fires in the direction of Cotentin and Montebourg. No air activity noted. 0115 intercepted TBS report H.M.S. Nelson torpedoed with all gone aft of Turret 4, bulkheads holding. 0120 Surface engagement indicated northward by star shells and tracers. 0135 surface engagement over, results unknown. 0200 sky clear, visibility excellent, artillery fire continues on all fronts. 0230 "Red" alert. 0240 Illumination flares being dropped. 0305 more flares. 0445 Dawn, with our own air cover overhead. No guided missile indications during the night. Admiral Bryant reports over TBS that Germans are counter attacking (Omaha Sector). 0628 Commenced firing Main Battery Mission 45. 16

¹⁵ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, USS Nevada, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure A page 25, page 44 of full report.

¹⁶ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure A page 26, page 45 of full report.


June 12, 1944, 0627-50 to 1207-50.



U.S.S. *Nevada* conducted Main Battery Missions 45, 46, 47, and 48 during this time period. Main battery Missions 45, 46, and 47 were against enemy artillery positions. Mission 48 was initially on Target #7A (German designation HKB Pernelle 1) but the pattern was move to Pernelle 2 (German designation Wn 148) that did not have a U.S. Target number.

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
Main Battery Mission 45



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 45 Enemy Artillery June 12, 1944, 0627-50 to 0728-30.¹⁷ French Lambert Zone 1 vO322122 Latitude: 49° 33' 02" N, Longitude: 1° 21' 55" W.

¹⁷ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 45-46, page 98-99 of full report

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
Author's note: This was the largest bombardment conducted by *Nevada* during the Normandy campaign expending 87 shells on a single target. I have not been able to identify the German unit involved. With 20 direct hits the German battery was reported destroyed. Keep in mind any spot within 50 yards is already within the blast radius of a 14-inch HC projectile. In order to achieve 20 direct hits more than one direct hit was scored when the spotter reported a hit on those salvos due to multiple projectiles in that pattern. For many salvos she was firing half broadsides or five guns for this mission to put more shells into the pattern. When she shifted coordinates, she would go back to firing two rounds until she got back on target and then increased to five once she had zeroed in on the target.

Nevada Main Battery Mission 46



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 46 Enemy Artillery June 12, 1944, 0759-45 to 0811-35. ¹⁸ Just north of Target 14. French Lambert Zone 1 vO344060 Latitude: 49° 29' 45" N, Longitude: 1° 19' 51" W.


¹⁸ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 46, page 100 of full report.



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
Author's note: Despite the good shooting she would engage the same target again for Mission 47.

Main Battery Mission 47



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 47 Enemy Artillery June 12, 1944, 0932-20 to 0940-30. ¹⁹ Just north of Target 14. French Lambert Zone 1 vO344060 Latitude: 49° 29' 45" N, Longitude: 1° 19' 51" W.

¹⁹ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 47, page 101 of full report.



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Author's note: Between Mission 46 and 47 these four guns were likely destroyed. It may be possible they are the troops from Target #14 (German designation HKB 2/230). Possibly this unit retreating to the north, but this must remain speculation on my part. Ozeville was sometimes referred to as Battery de Vaudival. Ozeville will be occupied by U.S. troops on June 13th, 1944.


Main Battery Mission 48




U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 48 Target #7A (German designation HKB Pernelle 1) June 12, 1944, 1105-30 to 1207-50.²⁰ Target coordinates French Lambert Zone 1 vO374198 Latitude: 49° 37' 16" N, Longitude: 1° 17' 55" W, land at the base of hill along road D328. Spotter then shifts coordinates to vO375204, Latitude: 49° 37' 35" N, Longitude: 1° 17' 52" W. However, the pattern is further moved to the right and ends up over La Pernelle 2 (German designation Wn148).


²⁰ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 48a-48b, page 102-103 of full report.

Part Three



La Pernelle 2 (German designation Wn148) just to the east of Target #7A is where Mission 48 ended. It did not have a U.S. Target number La Pernelle 2 battery is one of the three elements that make up the defensive complex around the village of La Pernelle, comprising two artillery batteries (Pernelle 1, Pernelle 2) and a radar station (station B7). 10th Battalion of the 1261st Marine Artillery Regiment was stationed here. Armed with 4 x 17 cm K18 guns.






Part Three

Author's note: I was not able to locate very much information on this target. Shortly before D-Day, the Allies bombed the La Pernelle 2 complex. One of the 170 mm guns was damaged during these attacks and then towed to Cherbourg for repairs. It is still under repair at the time of the U.S. invasion. This left three guns remaining. This position was likely destroyed by *Nevada* during Mission 48.

June 12, 1944, 1355-40 to 1433-10



U.S.S. *Nevada* completed Main Battery Missions 49 and 50 during this time period. Mission 49 was on an unidentified enemy tank concentration. Mission 50 was along a ridge near Quinéville.

Main Battery Mission 49



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 49 Tank Concentration estimated 40 tanks June 12, 1944, 1355-40 to 1407-00.²¹ Target coordinates French Lambert Zone 1 vO329202, Latitude: 49° 37' 22" N, Longitude: 1° 21' 40" W. Along road D26 4,600 yards west of Target #7A (German designation HKB Pernelle 1).

²¹ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 49, page 104 of full report.

			4	
		U.S.S. NEVADA		
S-E-0-	R-B-T			
		TTRRY MISSIONS FIN ME 6 - 17, 1944.	IED	
MISSIO	N NO. 49 Batter	y 14"/45 Cal. I	ate 12 June	1944
	Time _	1355-40 to 1407-00	_	
Terget	Coordinates 3292	02 Ship's Coord	inates 522	054
Target	Navigational Rang	e 26.550 Ge	in Range 28,	380
True B	earing 305-00			
	Humber and Descri			imated at
	ng method: Air Sp			
	No. of			
Salvos 2 3 4 5	1355-40 2 1358-20 2 1402-00 2 1404-40 5 1407-00 5	Spot Reserved 4 o'clock - 606 9 " - 300 - HIT 5 " - 206 Check Fire	U 600 D 300 NO	Applied L 3 R 05 NC R 03
	and orde Air repo	spotter reported a after two more sal red by Commander & spotter went down rted target area o he was unable to	ves cease fi combardment of to have a lo decured by s	ring was broup. ok and make and
	COMMENTS: None			
_				

Part Three

Author's note: I was not able to identify the German unit involved. The position is relatively well to the north, so I do not believe it was accidental friendly fire on U.S. troops because I do not believe U.S. troops are this far north at this time still being concentrated south of Target #14A (German designation Wn 22) and the town of Quinéville. The troops stationed in this area were 1st Battalion Grenadier-Regiment 729, but this was an infantry regiment not a tank unit.

Main Battery Mission 50



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 50 on a ridge at town of Quinéville June 12, 1944, 1429-05 to 1433-10.²² Target coordinates French Lambert Zone 1 vO350075 Latitude : 49° 30' 34" N, Longitude : 1° 19' 25" W point A, to vO360080 Latitude : 49° 30' 52" N, Longitude : 1° 18' 36" W point B.

²² United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 49, page 104 of full report.

			S.S. NEVADA		
			MINVAIN .C.		
S-E-C-R	-E-T				
			TERY MISSION 6 - 17, 19		
MISSION	NO50	Battery	14"/45 oal	Date 12 J	une 1944
		Time _14	29-05 to 14	33-10	
Terget	Coordinate	350075	to 360080	Ship's Coord	instes 522
Terget !	Nevigotion	al Range	18.850 G	un Range 20.0	70_
	aring _27				
				at town of an	ineville
Spottin	method:		od.		
Selvos	Timo	No.of Guns	Spot Rece	ived Spot	Applied
1	1429-05	2		D 200	
3	1429-35	4		D 200 D 200	R 05
		7 110			
RESULTS	1 Prespre		erdment. Co	esso firing w	as ordered
1	the shot	ender Bon to were "	bardment Grandwalked" alor	oup. As fire to	mas unobser
		undetern	ined.		
	J: None.				
OOLDERT:					
COLUMN					
OCCURN					
OCCUPANT					
OCCUPANT					
OCCURN					
COLUMN					

Part Three

Author's note: This was the last mission for June 12, 1944. She had expended 224 x 14-inch HC rounds on this day. She had remaining on board 200 x 14-inch AP, 530 x 14-inch HC, and 7,386 x 5-inch AA common projectiles.

From *Nevada*'s log: 0000 June 13 anchored as before. Weather cloudy, sky overcast, visibility fair, wind nil. 0100 E-Boat activity reported in Eastern area. Considerable air activity over assault area as indicated by AA fire from screen and own shore installations. 0154 -0227 intercepted and jammed five guided missile control signals. 0500 sky clearing, moon coming out. 1640 underway for Omaha area. In position for long range support of Army in Isigny-Carentan area. 1742 anchored in 10 fathoms water with San Marcouf Island bearing 316.2 degrees true, range 11,230 yards.²³

Nevada's log continues: 2038 support not required for tonight. Underway to protected anchorage for the night. 2106 anchored in 9 fathoms water with San Marcouf Island bearing 308 degrees true, 15, 050 yards distant. 2156 shifted berth to close on *Texas* to afford better screening.


0000 June 14 anchored as before. Weather cloudy, visibility fair to good, fresh westerly wind. 0205-0217 intercepted and jammed four guided missile control signals. No missiles seen. 2247-2300 intercepted and jammed six guided missile control signals. 2300 *Quincy* and *Tuscaloosa* in Utah area report jamming guided missile signal. Bomb drops in water and explodes close to these ships without damage. 2335 object suspected to be a mine or torpedo drops in water 1,000 yards east of *Texas* but does not explode.

0000 June 15 anchored as before. Weather clear visibility good, wind fresh. Intercepted German voice, believed aircraft communication. Many guided missile warnings but none intercepted by us. Some AA fire from beaches.²⁴ 0536 underway to shift berth for pre-arranged fire on enemy troop and artillery concentration in support of any attack on Carentan. 0633 commenced fire Main Battery Mission 51.

²³ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure A page 28, page 47 of full report.

²⁴ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure A page 29, page 48 of full report.

June 15, 1944, 0633-55 to 0714-30.




These two missions are the only missions U.S.S. *Nevada* conducted in the Omaha sector. Mission 51 was in support of Isigny area against German troops and Mission 52 on a German AA guns in the open near Wn 99. U.S.S. *Arkansas* was conducting missions in Utah sector.

Main Battery Mission 51



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 51 barracks, buildings, and infantry June 15, 1944, 0633-55 to 0653-00.²⁵ Target coordinates French Lambert Zone 1 vT467811, Latitude : 49° 16' 39" N, Longitude : 1° 08' 43" W.

²⁵ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 51, page 106 of full report.



Part Three

Author's note: U.S.S. *Nevada* moved to Omaha sector and U.S.S. *Arkansas* moved to Utah sector. Missions 51 and 52 were the only missions *Nevada* completed in the Omaha sector. ²⁶ ²⁷

• On June 15, 1944, at 0645 on the sixth salvo of Mission 51, the center gun of Turret 1 fired prematurely on loading position. This was the only gun scheduled to fire on this salvo and was the only gun loaded. The gun captain's switch was not closed, the turret officer's switch was not closed, and the operator of the plotting room director did not close his key as the ready lights were not on. The firing lock was changed and Turret 1 continued firing center gun until completion of mission 52. After cease firing the original firing lock was reinstalled to test it and try to determine the cause of the premature firing. The primers were fired electrically, and the firing lock operated perfectly. Then an attempt was made to fire by pulling the percussion firing lever back only part way and releasing it. This fired the primer. A second one was tried, and it fired. Then the same test was made on the firing lock on the left gun, and it fired. These primers were compared with the primer used when the premature firing occurred. The depth of indentation was greater than the indentation on those fired by percussion when the percussion firing lever was pulled all the way back automatically letting the firing pin be released as designed. It is therefore thought that the premature firing was caused by the gun captain or tray man catching the firing lever accidently with their hand or sleeve upon closing of the breech and pulling it only part way back and releasing it. Neither of these men remember hitting the percussion firing lever. There is the possibility that the primer may have been faulty, but such a possibility is very remote. The results of the test indicate that the percussion firing lever was struck in some manner. All personnel have again been cautioned not to touch the firing lock while closing the breech.

²⁶ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure E page 6, page 205 of full report.

²⁷ During Mission 51, the following casualties occurred:


Part Three

Main Battery Mission 52



U.S.S. *Nevada* Main Battery Mission 52 Battery of 80 mm guns June 15, 1944, 0657-45-55 to 0714-30.²⁸ Close to Wn 99. Target coordinates French Lambert Zone 1 vT462904 Latitude: 49° 21' 39" N, Longitude: 1° 09' 29" W. Troops which occupied Wn 99 may have moved in this direction after having been cut off by U.S. troops.

²⁸ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure B page 51, page 106 of full report.



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Author's note: These may be German troops from Wn 99, but this must remain speculation. This was the last mission conducted by U.S.S. *Nevada* for the Normandy Campaign. 0714 plane wanted to do some more shooting on other targets. However, received orders not to expend further ammunition, except in an emergency, to preserve gun life.²⁹ *Nevada* would remain on station until June 17 but did not conduct any gunfire missions during this time.

German Status between June 11 and June 15

By the morning of 11 June, the Crisbecq battery had run out of ammunition and medical equipment for the wounded and all of its guns were out of service. In the afternoon, Walter Ohmsen received a phone call from Admiral Walter Hennecke, who instructed him to escape with the survivors. Leaving 21 wounded German soldiers and 126 American prisoners behind, Ohmsen and 78 men broke through the American encirclement and reached the German lines at Aumeville, roughly 8 kilometers (5.0 miles) away during the night. It was the Americans of the 39th regiment of the 9th Infantry Division who captured the Crisbecq battery without fighting on the morning of June 12.

On June 14 U.S. forces broke through the Quinéville-Montebourg line capturing Target #14A (German designation Wn22) with the soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division taking possession of the site. U.S. forces proceeded to cut across the Cotentin peninsula with the goal of cutting off Cherbourg from the rear.

From June 12 to 14, the 4th Infantry Division progressed east of Montebourg, during this time and during the following four days, units facing the city had to conduct several patrols to check the defense line of the adversary, without committing itself. The artillery shells (terrestrial, aerial and navy) are unleashed on Montebourg, reducing the city into a vast pile of ashes. On June 19 the town of Montebourg falls to U.S. forces.

On June 17, Field Marshal von Rundstedt and Field Marshal Rommel met with Adolf Hitler at a command center named Wolfsschlucht 2 or W2 for short near the town of Margival, France. At this meeting both Rundstedt and Rommel attempted to convey to Hitler the Allied advantages in tactical air and naval gunfire support. Both Field Marshalls recommended withdrawing beyond the range of naval gunfire and Rommel suggested withdrawing German troops from the Cotentin peninsula before they were completely cut off, but this would result in Cherbourg falling.³⁰

Rommel no longer wanted to fight within the range of naval artillery. He requested that he be given full reign to command as he saw fit. He wanted more panzer strength allocated to

²⁹ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure A page 30, page 49 of full report.

³⁰ Crossroads at Margival, Hitler's Last Conference in France: June 17, 1944, by Peter Margaritis, page 17.

Part Three

him, much better air cover, and full support of the Kriegsmarine if he was to have any chance at all of turning back the enemy. He proposed that they give up the foolish idea of holding every square inch of land and fall back out of the range of naval artillery.³¹ This was largely Rundstedt's strategy prior to the allied invasion.

Rommel proposed another assault against Allied forces. He suggested moving strong defensive infantry units on the right flank and into the Orne sector. The panzer divisions would stay where they were protecting Caen. He would muster whatever he could and move them all to the Allies' left flank. The center would withdraw southward drawing the enemy down with them and further away from naval gunfire support. At a pre-determined weak point, the panzers would launch a massive attack against the exposed enemy right flank, out of range of naval artillery. His hope was to push allied forces back before air and naval assets could effectively intervene. 32

Hitler refused, saying that Cherbourg must be defended to the last man and refused to allow German infantry to attempt to escape the pocket but instead should withdraw toward Cherbourg defending every inch of territory. He felt Cherbourg was well fortified and could hold out until mid-July at least. Rommel disagreed and said Cherbourg would fall within a week.³³ Cherbourg fell on June 25, 1944.

Summary of Normandy Campaign

What is important is the level of operational planning at the very highest levels within this form of Government that acknowledges just how badly Allied naval gunfire support had affected the German operations. To make Rommel's point the following charts shows just how much ordinance was delivered by Bombardment Group U and the U.S.S. *Nevada* alone from June 6 to June 20.

Bombardment Group U ammunition expenditure for Normandy campaign.³⁴

Projectile Caliber and type	Number expended
15-inch HE	100^{35}
14-inch AP	260
14-inch HC	956
12-inch AP	74

³¹ Crossroads at Margival, Hitler's Last Conference in France: June 17, 1944, by Peter Margaritis, page 19.

³² Crossroads at Margival, Hitler's Last Conference in France: June 17, 1944, by Peter Margaritis, pages 26-27.

³³ Crossroads at Margival, Hitler's Last Conference in France: June 17, 1944, by Peter Margaritis, page 18.

³⁴ Commander Cruiser Division 7, A16-3 Serial 0061, Action Report Operation Neptune, July 10, 1944, page 35, Enclosure A, page 37 of full report, M.L. Deyo.

³⁵ 15-inch shells were fired by H.M.S. *Erebus* and H.M.S. *Warspite*. *Warspite* filled in at Utah beach when *Nevada* was at Plymouth replenishing.

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Projectile Caliber and type	Number expended
12-inch HC	40
8-inch AP 335 lb.	70
8-inch AP 260 lb.	98
8-inch HC	2,794
7.5-inch all types	1,200
6-inch AP	362
6-inch HE	2,308
5.25-inch SAP	65
5.25-inch HE	1,198
5-inch/38 caliber	14,600
5-inch/25 caliber	118
4-inch all type	40

U.S.S. Nevada's Main Battery ammunition expenditure³⁶

Date	AP	НС
June 6	69	268
June 7	74	276
June 8	84	155
June 11	33	13
June 12	0	224
June 15	0	20
Total	260	956

U.S.S. Nevada's Secondary Battery ammunition expenditure³⁷

Date	A.A. Common
June 6	2,693
June 7	608
June 8	190
June 11	40
Total	3,532

Near the end of the campaign *Nevada* was being restricted in the number of main battery salvos she could deliver in an attempt to prolong barrel life. The Normandy campaign was just the beginning of her support of the Allied invasion forces. She along with *Texas* and *Arkansas*

³⁶ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure F page 1, page 214 of full report.

³⁷ United States Atlantic Fleet, Battleship Division Five, U.S.S. *Nevada*, BB-36/A16-3/A9 Serial 0060, June 23, 1944, Enclosure F page 1, page 214 of full report.


Part Three

would continue their support off Cherbourg and then support Operation Anvil and the invasion of Southern France all within the next few weeks. Keeping her on the gun line was critical for these future operations.


Many people question if battleships played any significant role at Normandy or during the many other operations during WWII when conducting naval gunfire support. I hope by showing *Nevada* as an example that they did indeed play a major role and had a critical tactical, operational, and strategic impact on these operations. Performing naval gunfire support was not a minor or secondary mission because they were old or obsolete, but they were a primary mission that was always going to be fulfilled first. Naval battles require a willing partner and for the most part the Axis powers were unwilling to commit their battleships or surface navy in such combat or risk them in an attempt to lift a siege. There were always tactical plans within all the allied operations if the enemy navy committed to battle for the battleships to engage in classic naval combat like at Surigao Strait during the Leyte Gulf campaign in the Pacific, but it was the amphibious operation that was always the key and the number one priority.


Mahan understood that battleships are siege weapons that could control traffic through a geographical area no matter if that traffic was naval, air, or land. The sea along the coast is an extension of the land that an army cannot occupy. If you have a long extension of the coast with no navy to occupy this territory, then you are strategically weak and vulnerable to any maritime power that chooses to exploit that weakness. This is fundamentally Mahan's third principle which he then used to justify the building of a battle fleet and ships such as U.S.S. *Nevada*, U.S.S. *Texas*, and U.S.S. *Arkansas*. Operation Neptune was successful at establishing a lodgment on the continent of Europe for further operations by the combined allied armies. Operation Overlord with the strategic goal of destroying the Third Reich had begun.

Appendix 1 – Effect of Gun Barrel Wear




U.S.S. Nevada





Appendix 2 – Personnel Performance and Casualties



-	0		0		- 1
BB36/F15/MB	U.	s.s. Nevada		(11-Bs)	
		23 Ju	ne 1944.		
Subjects	Personnel peri invasion of the inclusive, 194	formance and cas ne Coast of Fran 4.	ualties du ce, 6-17 J	ring	
and in keep	ship contribute signed the NEV	the above tasks of directly to the above the continuous tradition for the continuous traditions to the continuous traditions traditions to the continuous traditions tra	he success	of the	
quence.	There were no	personnel casus	lties of a	ny conse-	
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Appendix 3- Utah Beach Allied Target List and German Designations

Allied Target	Target Coordinate	German Designation
Number	using the French	
	Lambert zone 1	
T 1	map	D: 4D II CED 75
Target 1	vT586938	Point Du Hoc STP 75
Target 2	vO266268	STP 234
Target 3	vO368043	Crisbecq STP 135
Target 4	vO355138	Morsalines battery – Stp 141
Target 5	vT533918	Maisy Battery STP 83
Target 6	vT405980	Ste. Martin de Varreville STP108
Target 7	vO246264	Battery Du Brulay
Target 8	vO391275	Battery de Gatteville STP 152 7./1261
Target 9	vO360022	Azeville STP 133
Target 10	vT792832	Unknown - North of Vaux-sur-Aure along road
		D104. North of Bayeux. 2000 yards west of
		Wn 46.
Target 11	vO353290	Battery de Caqueret STP 126
Target 12	vO378204	Wn 148
Target 13	vT848853	Unknown, along road D67 behind Wn 43
		Omaha Beach sector
Target 14	vO344057	HKB 2/230 Ozeville, near Village de Leglise
Target 15	vO342102	Unknown, Wooded area north of Lestre and
		slightly southwest of Amerville-Lestre
Target 16	vT528916	STP84 near Maisy
Target 17	vO339138	Battery de Crasville STP 142
Target 18	vO413160	STP 112 ex WN31
Target 20	vO353040	Unknown, Near Ferme du Chateau de
		Fontenay. Ruins visible.
Target 1A	vO366201	Unknown, Scars of bombardment remain
		visible. Northwest of 7A. 500 yards west of
		WN149.
Target 5A	vT797871	Battery Longues-sur-Mer Wn 48
Target 6A	vO369040	Crisbecq Wn 134 AA section
Target 7A	vO372198	HKB Pernelle 1
Target 8A	vO396229	Unknown, South of town of Montfarville
Target 12A	vO336197	Unknown, Rt de Quettehou D26. Possibly
		targeting road itself.
Target 12B	vO343191	Unknown, along road D128. Possibly
		Targeting Road itself.
Target 13A	vO361056	HKB Fontenay
Target 14A	vO361080	HKB Mont Coquerel Wn22

Allied Target Number	Target Coordinate	German Designation
Number	using the French Lambert zone 1	
	map	
Target 16A	vT531914	STP 85
Target 17A	vO323174	Unknown, Near town of Coimbot. Possibly
Turget 1771	VO323171	targeting road D25.
Target 32	vT537935	Wn81
Target 34	vT527935	Wn82
Target 36	vT541934	Wn87
Target 38	vT512924	Wn88
Target 40	vT505916	Wn90
Target 42	vT495905	Wn92
Target 44	vT447912	Wn100 ex Wn 1
Target 46	vT447918	Wn100 ex Wn 1
Target 48	vT447922	Wn101 ex Wn 2
Target 50	vT448926	Wn6
Target 52	vT448928	Wn2A
Target 54	vT458950	Wn102 ex Wn3
Target 56	vT452950	Wn102 ex Wn3
Target 58	vT444960	Wn4
Target 60	vT452967	Wn 104 ex Wn 5
Target 62	vT442970	Wn 7
Target 64	vT442980	Wn 106 ex Wn8 south
Target 66	vT442982	Wn 106 ex Wn8 north
Target 68	vT443983	Seawall in front of Wn 106 ex Wn8
Target 70	vT436992	Wn 100 ex Wn9
Target 72	vT438993	Wn 100 ex Wn9
Target 74	vT428999	STP 101 ex WN 10
Target 76	vT423009	Between STP 101 ex Wn10 and Wn 102 ex
		WN 11 & Wn12
Target 78	vO421009	South of Wn 102 ex WN 11 & Wn12 and
Target 80	vO420015	Wn 102 ex WN 11 & Wn12
Target 82	vO415024	Wn 102 ex WN 11 & Wn12
Target 84	vO407033	WN103 ex WN 13
Target 86	vO398045	WN104 ex WN 14
Target 88	vO392057	Church Eglise Notre Dame de bon secours
Target 90	vO398063	Wn 105 ex Wn 16 &Wn 17 (South WN16)
Target 92	vO390061	Wn 105 ex Wn 16 &Wn 17 (WN17)
Target 94	vO383069	Wn 105 ex Wn 16 &Wn 17 (WN17)
Target 96	vO379077	WN106 ex WN 18
Target 98	vO375082	WN106 ex WN 18
Target 100	vO373085	La Sinope Dam
Target 102	vO374086	WN 107 ex WN19

Allied Target Number	Target Coordinate using the French Lambert zone 1	German Designation
	map	
Target 104	vO368096	WN 107 ex WN19
Target 106	vO364108	South of Wn 108 ex WN23
Target 108	vO362114	Wn 108 ex WN23
Target 110	vO362129	North of Wn 108 ex WN23
Target 112	vO357143	Road Ham de Beauvais close to WN 140
Target 114	vO366145	WN 109 ex WN 25
Target 122	vO389143	STP 110 ex WN29
Target 124	vO395156	STP 111 ex WN30

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